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 Abstract:  The 1981 reform of the Chilean pension system was revolutionary at 
its time. It was the first instance of a mature public Pay-As-You-Go social security 
system being converted into a mandatory defined contribution system managed by 
the private sector. This paper contends that a unique confluence of events were 
responsible for this change. The rise of a dictatorship in Chile, a struggling public 
retirement system, and a cadre of Chicago oriented economists determined to 
make Chile a model free market neoliberal economy. This was later followed by the 
Washington Consensus and the promotion of Chilean reform by the World Bank. 
This paper analyzes the Chilean reform and its subsequent development; evaluating 
it on both efficiency and equity grounds. While the evidence for efficiency gains is 
mixed there is little doubt that equity has suffered under the new system. 
Nevertheless, it continues to evolve and equity concerns are increasingly being 
addressed.  
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The ousting of Salvador Allende in 1973 led to a sharp reorientation of Chile’s socio-
economic system. Following the coup, the country was left to cope with a moribund 
economy and one of the highest inflation rates in the world.  Furthermore, Fischer, 
Sahay, and Vegh (2002), note that cumulative inflation during the 68 months 
between October 1971 and May 1977 was 1, 279%. The subsequent leadership of 
General Augusto Pinochet and his successors championed a more free-market 
orientation. Economists associated with the University of Chicago were relied on to 
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fashion a new social order. Some would say that a cornerstone of this individualist, 
market-oriented approach was the social security system implemented in 1981 (Kritzer 
2005). Social Security reform in Chile has drawn a great deal of attention from policy 
analysts in the United States (Diamond 1993; Mitchell and Ataliba 1997; Kay 2000; 
Ghilarducci and Ledesma 2000; Madrid 2000; Williamson 2001; Borzutzky 2003; 
Cypher 2004; Larrraín-Ríos 2005).  It has been the subject of controversy with 
opponents lamenting its disappointing performance while those with an interest in 
establishing private accounts and utilizing equities to bolster social security rates of 
returns have pointed to high returns and its influence upon reforms in more than 
twenty countries (AFP Association 2005a). It was the first conversion of a major 
public Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) retirement system into a system of privately funded 
individual retirement accounts (Borzutzky 2003). It has been held up as the model for 
reform by the World Bank becoming an almost inevitable reference in any discussion 
about different ways to overcome the economic effects of an aging population and to 
reduce political risk faced by traditional social security systems around the world.  
This paper will examine the 1981 reform of the Chilean social security system as 
well as efforts to modify the system that continued through the government of Michel 
Bachelet.  We argue three points:  First, the original 1981 reform was the result of a 
confluence of events. Pinochet needed an economic team to reorder the economy and 
made use of Chilean economists trained either at the University of Chicago or with a 
Chicago orientation. At the same time there was an emerging global trend for neo-
liberal policies that would become known as the Washington Consensus (Williamson 
1993). The initial popularity of the reform was underpinned by powerful multilateral 
institutions promoting the Washington Consensus.  The Chilean reforms became a 
model of what free market reforms could accomplish. To this end the World Bank 
has spent over $5.4 billion promoting variants of the Chilean Social Security Reform 
(Hua 2006). 
Our second point is that equity has been compromised by this reform. While 
the system continues to evolve, private individual accounts for each worker remain. 
Much has been written regarding social justice, much of it applicable to the question 
of what makes for an equitable retirement system (Rawls 1971; Ghilarducci 1992; 
Moss 1996; Ball and Mankiw 2001; Euzéby 2004; Nickel 2005). An equitable system 
should provide a minimum sufficient for subsistence for all retired citizens. It should 
spread risk in such a way as to protect those lacking other means of support in 
retirement. Income disparities during retirement years should not be worse than those 
during working years. It should be more than a retirement savings vehicle and should 
include aspects of social insurance such as disability and survivors benefits. Finally, it 
should be financed on an ability to pay basis. Many workers avoid contributing to the 
new system and therefore will receive little in the way of retirement benefits from it. 
This wide scale non-participation indicates the lack of support enjoyed by the system 
and points to perceptions that it may not be equitable. The fact that one of the major 
planks of President Bachelet’s campaign was reform of the system further indicates 
concern about equity.  
Our third argument is that one of the goals of the reform, to promote efficiency, 
has been at best, only partially achieved. An efficient social security system should be 
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universal in order to foster widespread support and generate economies of scale and 
scope. Administration of the system should absorb a small percentage of workers’ 
contributions. Returns should be comparable to those elsewhere within the country 
for given levels of risk. If possible, it should not distort either capital or labor markets. 
High administrative costs have reduced benefits that participants expect from the 
system and finally, portfolio constraints, designed to reduce workers’ exposure to risk 
have effectively reduced the risk-adjusted rate of return that the new accounts are able 
to produce. It is not clear that pension reforms have improved efficiency but it is clear 
that concerns about equity remain. 
While there is evidence that capital markets have developed (Morande 1998; 
Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel 2003) the small size of the Chilean market results in too 
few private domestic outlets for social security funds. Increasingly the retirement 
industry has become concentrated in the hands of six firms and this lack of 
competition has resulted in higher than necessary administrative costs and large 
profits (Diamond and Valdés-Prieto 1994).  
Participation by the self-employed is voluntary. Therefore, they can either opt 
out of the system or participate but not fully declare their income. Survivors also have 
rights to benefits earned by a spouse or parent. Nevertheless, this aspect of social 
insurance accrues only to participants in the system and we will explain that a 
significant portion of the Chilean workforce either completely avoid participation or 
participate only sporadically. 
Institutional economics is uniquely suited to examining the evolution of the 
Chilean Social Security System. The “old” school of institutional economics has been 
defined as having five key characteristics: 1) it is not defined by any policy proposals; 
2) it is interdisciplinary relying heavily on fields such as psychology, sociology, history 
and anthropology to better understand human behavior; 3) institutions are 
emphasized for their importance and special attention is placed on innovation and 
technical change; 4) it is recognized that institutions are embedded in a broader set of 
social, cultural, political and power relationships; and 5) the traditional neoclassical 
utility maximizing model of individual behavior is considered inadequate because it 
does not satisfactorily account for social, cultural and other influences (Hodgson 
2000). This fifth point is probably the most important differentiating factor between 
the old and new schools. But it is the fourth point that is of greater relevance here. 
The importance of social influence and cultural norms on conformity has long been 
emphasized as critical to understanding a wide range of economic activities and 
Chile’s experience should be seen in such a context (Commons 1931; Mitchell 1910). 
 
The Chilean Social Security Program and its Reform 
 
Pinochet took power at a time when a cadre of Chicago oriented economists were 
positioned to assume policy making roles in the government. These economists 
shared the same liberal thinking as Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger and 
implemented the new pension system with the backing of Pinochet (Barber 1995; 
Silva 2004).  At the time the reform was introduced the Washington Consensus was 
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not a fully articulated policy prescription but the Reagan administration was clearly 
signaling its preference for business over labor and markets over government. 
Multilateral lending institutions were also searching for mechanisms by which 
markets and free trade could be encouraged. 
 Prior to its reform, the Chilean system, which was created in 1925, was a very 
comprehensive social security program that covered more than 70 percent of the 
population (Borzutzky 2003). Nevertheless, the system faced financial stress with high 
costs and expenditures reaching 17 percent of GNP in 1971 (Teissonniere 2005). 
Benefits were unequal as were contributions.  There were 100 different pension 
schemes run by 32 institutions, each with its own financial arrangements (Altman 
2004).  In some cases, payroll taxes were as high as 69 percent of wages (Acuña and 
Iglesias 2001).  Each time a new group of workers was given coverage it was subject to 
different rules with different benefits.  Also, affiliation to each institution was tied to 
the economic sector in which the worker was employed and the lack of competition 
reduced incentives for efficiency (Cheyre 1991). Beginning in the 1950s, succeeding 
presidents tried to reform the system with little luck.  Everybody wanted to change the 
system as long as such change did not harm their interests (Borzutzky 2003). 
Pinochet was determined to alter political relations of the Chilean state (Silva 
1993; Loveman and Davis 1997; Borzutzky 2003). The old pension system 
encouraged political organization by interested stakeholders. Groups that gained from 
different tax and benefit structures fought to defend them. The new model, by 
instituting a system of private accounts, effectively atomized participants. Each 
individual was interested only in the performance of his or her account. In addition 
Pinochet banned all union activity. 
 Infused with free-market idealism, the Chilean government declared that their 
retirement scheme would be a model of free-market provision of a governmentally 
mandated Social Security system.  José Piñera, then Minister of Labor and Social 
Welfare, began working on the existing hodge-podge of industry-based social 
insurance plans.  The plan was drafted by a commission, headed by economist Martin 
Cóstabal but Piñera was the intellectual author of the reform.  The commission 
worked in secret and consulted with none of the social groups present in civil society.  
It totally transformed the administrative, financial, and benefits structures of the 
social security system.  It should be noted that this plan, implemented by the military 
dictatorship, did not include the armed forces.  Their system remained untouched 
(Borzutzky 2003). 
The World Bank began to publicly promote Chilean style systems.  Their public 
justification for supporting pension reform has been that public pension systems do 
not deliver on their social objectives; they have created severe distortions in the 
operation of market economies and are not financially sustainable when facing aging 
populations (Palacios 2004).  A transition from defined benefit to defined 
contribution plans was seen as fiscally responsible.  More than 20 countries on four 
continents have adopted the defined contribution approach to social security. 
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Two benefits were expected from the Chilean reform. First, by reducing social 
security contributions, which averaged twenty-five percent of payroll, to ten percent, 
incentives to work should have increased. Second, by allowing contributions to be 
invested in private securities it was thought that capital markets would be deepened 
and broadened (Mitchell and Flavio1997; Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel 2003). Stephen 
Kay (1999), however, notes that transition costs, which consist of the government’s 
accrued liabilities to workers enrolled in the old system at the time of the reform, 
were nearly five percent of GDP and this was confirmed by a Chilean government 
report which found that the new system generated fiscal deficits averaging 5.7 percent 
of GDP in the period 1981-1998 (MIDEPLAN 2000).  More recent data shows that 
the total fiscal deficit due to spending on retirement income peaked at 7.6 percent in 
1984 but had fallen to six percent by 2002 (Arenas de Mesa 2004). Increased flows to 
capital markets were thus to a large degree offset by these deficits. 
 
The 1981 Reform 
 
The core of the system is a mandatory 10 percent contribution every employee must 
make to a defined contribution plan each month.  These plans are managed by 
Pension Fund Administrators (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones [AFPs]), 
private firms whose sole function is to administer individual retirement accounts and 
to provide social security benefits.  The AFP is a for-profit corporation and profits 
Year Countries 
1981 Chile 
1993 Peru 
1994 Argentina, Colombia 
1995 Uruguay 
1997 Mexico, Bolivia, Panama 
1998 El Salvador, Hungary, Kazakistan 
1999 Poland 
2000 Costa Rica 
2001 Latvia 
2002 Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Kosovo 
2003 Dominican Republic, Russian Federation, India 
2005 Slovakia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Ukraine, Lithuania 
In the process of 
implementation 
Macedonia  
  
 
Table 1: Reforms Based on Saving and Individual Accounts 
Source: (AFP Association 2005a). 
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result from the commissions charged for the administration of the retirement 
accounts (AFP Association 2006a; Borzutzky 2003; Berstein and Chumacero 2005).  
There is an additional contribution of two percent of wages charged as a monthly 
premium for term life and disability insurance and both of these contributions are 
subject to a maximum wage base.  Finally, the commission fees charged by each AFP 
have ranged from 0.6 percent to one percent of wages per month (Edwards 1996). 
The AFPs, in turn, provide insurance against old-age as well as disability and 
survivor’s benefits for a member’s widow, widower if disabled, the mother of a 
member’s illegitimate child or the deceased member’s offspring. Members may retire 
upon reaching the legal retirement age of 65 (60 if they are women) or 10 years short 
of the legal retirement age if they have accumulated funds sufficient to pay a pension 
of  at least 50 percent of their average taxable income for the previous 10 years (SAFP 
2006a).   
The AFPs are overseen by the Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos 
de Pensiones (SAFP) (Office of Pension Fund Administrators Supervision), which is 
the controlling organization that represents the State within the Chilean system of 
pensions based on individual capitalization.  It is an autonomous entity, which is 
financed with funds from the public budget, whose highest authority is the 
Superintendent, named by the President of the Republic and which coordinates with 
the government through the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (Acuña and Iglesias 
2001; SAFP 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). The SAFP began its oversight functions on May 1, 
1981 and this supervisory, technical and highly professionalized organization has as its 
objective the supervision and control of the AFPs and of the Administradora de 
Fondos de Cesantia (AFC) (Unemployment Fund Administrator). These entities, 
which collect the contributions, invest the resources and pay the retirement and 
unemployment benefits to those insured (SAFP 2006b).  The SAFP should not be 
confused with the trade and lobby organization for the AFPs, which is the Chilean 
Pension Fund Administrators’ Association, which began its operation on October 14, 
1981, just five months after the 1981 reform (AFP Association 2006a). This 
organization provides statistical data and studies to promote Chilean style systems 
around the world.  
Since its reform the Chilean pension system has undergone two more changes 
both occurring during the post-1991 democratic government era. The first, in 2002, 
was the introduction of five different fund types, called multi funds, in which 
members could invest (Larraín-Ríos 2005). These are similar to what participants use 
in defined contribution plans in the United States. The key difference is that 
members may only choose one fund type to house their contributions. In general, 
anyone belonging to the system may choose one of five funds, with the exception of 
men over the age of 55 and women over the age of 50 who are not pensioners (SAFP 
2006c).  They may opt for only four of the five funds.  They may not invest in Fund 
A, which has most of its investment portfolio in equities.  In the same way, pensioners 
using programmed withdrawal can only choose between the three funds with lower 
investment in equities (Funds C, D and E). The restrictions referred to above are only 
applicable to savings in the Mandatory Individual Capitalization Account. Members 
The Chilean Pension System at 25 Years 
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may change funds up to twice a year without cost and funds belonging to the same 
AFP have identical commissions.  The structure of funds is shown in Table 2 below 
and includes different risk and investment tools including hedging operations (SAFP 
2006c).  
Table 2 shows the portions of a fund’s portfolio that can be held in the two 
main types of assets. Fund E is the most conservative and is suitable for those close to 
retirement. Fund D contains a bit more risk and is the default fund that men older 
than 55 and women older than 50 are assigned to if they fail to make a choice.  Fund 
C is the default for those men aged 35 to 55 and women aged 35 to 50 while men 
under 35 and women under 35 are assigned to fund B.  The riskiest portfolios are 
those held in Fund A.  This choice of funds allows workers to tailor their portfolios to 
their level of risk aversion and their life-cycle stage (SAFP 2006c). 
Table 2: Maximum and Minimum Investments by Fund Type in the Chilean 
AFP System 
 Fund Type 
Investment Type A B C D E 
Minimum fixed return assets 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Maximum variable return assets 80% 60% 40% 20% None 
Minimum variable return assets 40% 25% 15% 5% None 
Source: SAFP 2006b: 16. 
 The other change by the democratic government was the introduction in 
2003 of a voluntary retirement savings program.  In this program the worker has the 
choice of depositing amounts above the mandatory 10 percent into an AFP.  These 
funds are tax-deferred and workers can deposit up to about US$1,750 per month 
(AFP Association 2006b; 2006c). These provide additional protection to medium to 
high income workers who can afford to save (World Bank 1994).  
 
Evaluation of the Reform 
 
Two important questions about the reform must be answered. Was it equitable and 
was it efficient? We answer in the negative to equity and find an ambiguous impact 
on efficiency. President Bachelet improved the equity of the system but these reforms 
have so far fallen short of what is necessary.  Further, far too many people, it is 
projected, will qualify for only a minimum pension after a lifetime of labor (Hua 
2006, 1). As for efficiency, the evidence is mixed in terms of capital market 
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improvements and there is evidence that labor markets may be distorted by the 
reform (Packard 2007). 
As previously noted, an equitable system should provide a minimum sufficient 
for the subsistence of all retired citizens. One of the worker protections provided by 
the Chilean system is a guaranteed minimum benefit for those retiring with ten years 
of credits but insufficient assets in their portfolios to provide such a benefit (Diamond 
1993; AFP Association 2004).  The minimum benefit scheme was introduced at the 
time of the 1981 reform but has been found to be inadequate.  President Bachelet 
campaigned on a platform that called for reform of the Social Security system.  In her 
first month in office she raised the minimum pension, received by 1.2 million 
persons, by 10 percent; 90 percent of this increase went to those in the old system and 
10 percent to participants in the AFP system.  This new improvement in the Chilean 
pension system will cost around US$180 million and will be financed by maintaining 
Chile’s value-added tax at 19 percent instead of reducing it to 18 percent as had been 
mandated by law (La Tercera 2005).   
Risk should be spread in such a way as to protect those most vulnerable. 
Retirement income can come from a mixture of three sources: social security, private 
saving and employer provided pensions. Low income workers typically do not have 
the means to save on their own. Nor are they often provided with pensions by their 
employers. This means that their primary source of income during retirement years 
comes from social security. However, Chile’s social security transformation has 
subjected savers to macroeconomic fluctuations.  
All wage based social security programs will be subject to the risk that 
unemployment brings with it, the interruption of employment and hence 
contributions. The difference between a mandatory savings plan (defined 
contribution) and a formula based plan (defined benefit) is that the size of the benefit 
in a defined contribution plan is also a function of how well the portfolio performs.  
A defined contribution plan only works if one contributes to it.  A major criticism of 
the Chilean program is that most informal sector workers do not belong to an AFP 
and that many of those workers, formal and informal, who are affiliated with an AFP, 
fail to make contributions.  The fact that about 36 percent of the Chilean workforce 
belongs to the informal sector has led to estimates that as many as 50 percent of 
eligible workers may not be contributing to the system (AFP Association 2006b; 
2005b).  The graph below, developed from data taken from the AFP Association’s 
web page shows that contribution rates of members have been falling over time.  In 
2005, only 49 percent of members were making contributions, a figure which has 
fallen since 1985 (authors’ calculations from AFP Association 2006b).  Nevertheless, 
the association boasts that 66 percent of those in the workforce are covered (AFP 
Association 2005b). 
Our own analysis of the Chilean Survey of Socioeconomic Status [Encuesta de 
Caracterización Socioeconómica] (CASEN) 2003 data, showed that 26.5 percent of 
respondents belonged and contributed to an AFP while another 21.2 percent 
belonged but did not contribute (Buchholz, Coustasse and Silva 2006).  
The Chilean Pension System at 25 Years 
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Several problems flow from this. One is that the amount accumulated by the 
worker in his or her AFP will be undermined for each month a contribution is not 
made. This will increase the number of retirees eligible for the minimum pension 
which is, at this time, insufficient to provide even a subsistence income. Substantial 
differences of opinion exist on what kind of income distribution is equitable and fair. 
Institutional economics stands out here in an important and related way. Institutional 
economists, especially of the old school, commonly believe that an important attribute 
of an economic system is the provision of a decent standard of living (Gordon 1980). 
Many countries of the world generate a sufficient level of output to provide such a 
minimum level of economic welfare for their populations. Social security systems are 
meant to provide acceptable minimums for retirees and others who cannot work. If a 
social security system evolves into a pension system with returns dependent on 
portfolio performance the security in the system is jeopardized. The ability to provide 
a basic minimum, in spite of asset allocation controls, has been undercut and those 
who sustain market losses, or even insufficient gains, will suffer. Chile’s public 
pension system does provide minimum benefit levels and in December 2006 these 
ranged for adults from approximately US$663 per year to US$2,374 per year using 
market exchange rates (Instituto Nacional de Pensiones (INP) 2006).  The range is a 
function of age, health status and the existence of dependents. These levels of support 
understate living conditions and a better measure relies on the World Bank’s 
purchasing power parity index. This yields a range from US$1,293 to US$4,629 in a 
country with a purchasing power parity adjusted per capita income of $11,470 in 
2005 (World Bank 2006).  
Figure 1.  Contribution to an AFP as a Percent of AFP Members 
Source: Authors’ calculations from AFP Association 2006b.  
Percent of AFP Members That Contribute
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Further, one of the basic principles of social insurance is broad coverage of the 
population in order to spread risk. While it is true that the Chilean Social Security 
system provides disability and survivor’s benefits, they are predicated upon 
participation. The high level of noncompliance with the system has produced large 
holes in the safety net. We see adverse selection at play here in which those most in 
need of risk protection opt out of the program. That they are able to do so is the 
result of flaws in the design of the program. 
An equitable system also would be financed on an ability to pay basis. It is 
tempting to say that this is met because all participants contribute a flat 10% of their 
salaries to an AFP and therefore the system uses proportional financing. While many 
argue that progressive financing is better, most contend that proportional financing 
meets the bare minimum of an equitable system. But there is a problem with the 
minimum pension. The majority of those who receive this are low-income retirees. 
However, it is possible to participate in the system in a high paying job for nine years, 
leave it by way of self-employment, and then return in the last year before retirement 
in order to accumulate the ten years necessary for the minimum benefit.  Current 
rules require that a worker contribute during the final year of employment. Part of the 
minimum, which comes out of general revenue, will therefore be paid to upper 
income workers resulting in a transfer from poor to rich. 
Finally the goal of promoting efficiency has only been partially achieved.  The 
system should absorb a small percentage of workers’ contributions in terms of 
administrative costs. We have already seen that when calculated on the basis of 
percent of contribution that these costs range from six percent to ten percent 
(Diamond and Valdés-Prieto 1994). This compares with the U.S. Social Security 
system which absorbs less than one percent. 
Buoyed by high and falling interest rates, the AFPs delivered a 10.5 percent real 
average yield from its inception (Andrews 2006).  Nevertheless this return may be 
more than meets the eye. Diamond observed that during the period from 1981 to 
1993 the Chilean economy generated high rates of return in general and that fund 
managers could not be credited with particularly astute investment choices (Diamond 
1993).  Yet they certainly have been expensive.  Between 1981 and 1998 unadjusted 
returns were 11 percent.  When administrative expenses are deducted this falls to an 
estimated 5.1 percent (Kay 1999).   
One way to compare this is to look at various market indices. The Morgan 
Stanley Emerging Markets Equity Portfolio began in 1992 and has averaged 12.6% 
and its Emerging Markets Debt Portfolio has averaged 11.1% since its inception in 
1994 (Morgan Stanley 2007). The Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Latin America 40 index 
has averaged 18.7% over the past ten years while the S&P 500 has averaged 6.7% over 
the same period (Standard & Poor 2007). 
A recent record of inadequate returns was admitted by the Superintendent of 
AFPs in 2005, when it released a study showing an estimated loss of close to $6 
billion, equivalent to a tax of more than five percent of the investments of the 
affiliates since the inception of the AFP system due to the restrictions placed on 
acceptable AFP investment vehicles and restrictions on the amount that could be 
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invested outside of Chile, which is 30 percent (Berstein and Chumacero 2005). The 
Office of AFP Supervision recognized as well that without such regulation, affiliates 
would have been exposed to greater risk (Berstein and Chumacero 2005).  It was in 
response to such criticisms that the multi fund system was created. 
Proponents of pension finance reform in Chile argue that privatization has 
improved the efficiency of capital markets and resulted in higher levels of productivity 
and faster economic growth.  They also contend that savings rates have increased.  
Chile has indeed grown faster than other Latin American countries.  The World 
Bank reports Chile’s average annual growth from 2000 to 2004 at 3.4 percent.  This 
exceeds that of Argentina (-0.1 percent), Brazil (2.0 percent) and Uruguay (-1.2 
percent) (World Bank 2006).  But there are many factors that drive growth and it is 
often difficult to determine the importance of a single factor, such as capital markets 
from the aggregate data.  The econometric work that has been done shows with a 
fairly high degree of confidence that Chile’s capital markets have become more 
efficient and have contributed to faster economic growth (Morande 1998; Kassimatis 
and Spyrou 2001). The question remains however, whether this can be attributed to 
social security reform which was, after all, only one piece of a widespread systemic 
reorientation.  
 
Discussion 
 
The Chilean pension system as it enters its twenty-sixth year remains in need of 
further adjustments or corrections.  As a provider of retirement income to those 
currently retired it appears to have done an adequate job for some. Yet a large 
percentage of pensioners are drawing the minimum pension guaranteed by the state 
indicating that their accounts are not sufficient to provide the higher pensions 
promised by the reform. It should also be noted that the period 1981-2004 saw higher 
rates of return than can be expected in the future.  Further, gaps in contributions 
produced by spells of unemployment or noncompliance will put downward pressure 
on accumulations and hence benefits (Soto 2005).  On the brighter side, many expect 
administrative fees to fall as the system matures.  It should be noted, though, that 
much younger systems than Chile’s already have lower administrative expenses.  
Mexico and Uruguay both have lower expenses.  Peru and Argentina have equal levels 
of expense (Mitchell 1999). The much older U.S. system which remains PAYG has 
expenses 50 percent less than any other country mentioned above (Diamond 1993). 
Chile’s economic reforms and the enthusiasm that many hold for them should 
be viewed in light of conservative values and perspectives that solidified in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Global stagflation in the 1970s led to disillusion with Keynesian demand 
management and a shift toward more supply side orientations. Many favored greater 
market rigor to boost productivity and output. In economic development circles the 
“Washington Consensus” evolved calling for economic “liberalization” with limited 
roles for government, generally confined to protecting private property, education and 
health (Williamson 1993; Gualerzi 2005). This ethic became the norm in financial 
circles and to a lesser extent among academics.  
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Important and powerful players buttressed these conventions. Multilateral 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the 
United Nations along with proprietary financial ties formed a backdrop of power 
relations and attitudes that helped underpin the legitimacy of Chile’s experience. The 
transmission of values in support of institutions that serve elites is a familiar and 
consistent theme in institutional economics from Veblen to the present (Veblen 
1953). Yet for most communities of economists and other social scientists these 
important issues are often ignored or downplayed (McConnell 1970). 
Chile’s relatively high growth rates have been touted as evidence of the success 
of the Pinochet approach to social security, in spite of ambiguous theoretical and 
empirical findings that national savings rates were increased as a result of privatization 
of retirement accounts (Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 1999; White 2000). The 
primary impact of privatization of social security funds on macroeconomic finance is 
simply to change the identity of those who hold government debt (Eisner 1998).  Any 
real change in structure requires alterations in the supply of equity and debt. It is 
difficult to determine if changes in public savings in Chile offset increases in private 
savings. The privatization of retirement accounts in Chile has had other effects that 
are more clearly positive. There does seem to be agreement that capital markets 
developed more than would otherwise have occurred and this may have stimulated 
economic growth (Arenas de Mesa and Mesa-Lago 2006). However, social security 
reform occurred in the context of other growth measures such as trade liberalization.  
Equity, or distributive justice is perhaps of greater concern and it has been given short 
shrift in many assessments of Chile because equity has not been a pressing priority 
under the Washington Consensus. It is often asserted that a rising economic tide will 
eventually lift all boats.  
A major problem facing Chile’s system is lack of participation. If a solution to 
this dilemma is not found, the Chilean state will be facing the prospect of paying 
minimum pensions to a majority of retirees. Elimination of the option to opt out by 
the self-employed would be one step toward solving this problem. Another might be 
for the state to match part of the workers’ contributions up to some maximum in 
much the same way as U.S. 401(k) plans include employer matches. Also, tax 
incentives could be given to firms in the formal sector to sponsor pension plans that 
would supplement social security and serve to draw workers from the informal sector. 
Praise for Chile’s pension system transcends its national institutions. The same 
arguments have been used to urge analogous social security reforms in the United 
States including those put forward by President George W. Bush. But Chile’s reforms 
do not assure gains in efficiency for the United States. U.S. financial markets are 
already well developed and there is no guarantee that national savings rates will rise. A 
greater return for social security recipients is a laudable objective but the risks 
associated with privatization are unacceptable unless a decent minimum level of 
support can be assured. The U.S. social security system may need reform, but fiscal 
problems, yet to arise, should not be used to undermine one of the most important 
pillars of social stability established in the 20th century (Papadimitriou and Wray 
1999; Bell and Wray 2000; Buchholz 2007). 
The Chilean Pension System at 25 Years 
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Finally, it should be remembered that social security systems are nothing more 
than financing mechanisms. The standard of living of retirees will depend on the 
productivity of their children and grandchildren.  Once one ceases to produce, his or 
her consumption must come out of the production of those who are younger.  
Pension schemes have a tremendous impact upon the distribution of consumption, 
but more important to the retirement income of much of the population is the 
continuing health of that economy during their working and retirement years. 
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